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CASE COMMENTS
the employees' designation of a representative, rather than the employer's
recognition of a representative, triggers the application of subsection (A)(i).
Under the Wilson dissent's and the Tenth Circuit's rationale, the FLSA
prohibits employers from reaching an agreement with individual employees
if those employees have already designated a representative.
N. LIMITATION oF ACTIONS
Shofer v. Hack Co.
970 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1992)
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 557 (ERISA), like many
federal statutes, does not provide time limitations for all causes of action
within its domain. When the timeliness of litigation under such legislation
is at issue, a federal court must often look to the statutes of limitation in
the state in which the court sits, and must apply the state's statute of
limitation most analogous to the substance of the federal law in question.
558
The common law has long included the principle of equitable tolling to
prevent, in special circumstances, patently unjust applications of a statute
of limitations. This judicial doctrine is embodied in both federal and state
court decisions, but the circumstances required for its application vary
among jurisdictions. The United States Supreme Court in Burnett v. New
York Central Railroad Co. 559 held that the statute of limitations should be
tolled for an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
when the plaintiff had initially brought timely suit in a state court having
jurisdiction but lacking venue.56 Since Burnett, the federal courts have
struggled with how to dispose of similar cases, under a variety of federal
statutes, in which the state court lacked not only venue, but jurisdiction as
well. Some have broadened Burnett's reasoning to include such cases,
56'
while others have taken Burnett at face value and have restricted its
application to cases involving dismissal for improper venue. 62 A number of
557. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
558. See Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981 (4th Cir. 1987)
(ruling that suit brought under civil enforcement provisions of ERISA was governed by limitation
under Maryland law for breach of contract actions); see also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980) (holding that federal courts hearing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims must apply
analogous statutes of limitation and tolling rules of states in which they sit).
559. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
560. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1965).
561. See Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th
Cir.) (relying on Supreme Court's reasoning in Burnett to toll statute of limitations in action
originally filed in court lacking jurisdiction), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); Reynolds v.
Logan Charter Serv., Inc., 565 F.Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (applying Burnett doctrine to
Jones Act action originally filed in court lacking subject matter jurisdiction).
562. See Covey v. Arkansas River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989) (maintaining that
Fifth Circuit had not yet ruled on applicability of equitable tolling to Jones Act cases dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, but nevertheless denying equitable tolling to plaintiff who filed claim
twice in court of improper jurisdiction).
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courts have steered a course between those extremes, concluding that eq-
uitable tolling may be appropriate when the original forum's lack of
jurisdiction was not clear at the initiation of litigation.563
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Shofer
v. Hack Company 64 addressed the procedural issue of equitable tolling in
the narrow context of ERISA litigation, and provided alternative evaluations
of an equitable tolling claim under both federal common law and Maryland
law. Plaintiff Shofer owned a business that had established an ERISA tax
qualified pension plan for its employees. Shofer hired defendant Hack to
administer the plan, and relied on Hack to perform certain ministerial duties
and to give advice on tax questions with respect to the pension plan.
In 1984, Shofer asked Hack whether he could borrow money from the
pension plan. Hack's written reply assured Shofer that such borrowing was
permissible, but did not mention the significant tax consequences attendant
to it. Relying on Hack's advice, Shofer drew loans totaling $375,000 from
the pension plan. In late 1986, he realized that he was liable for income
tax on all of this money.
Shofer initiated litigation in 1988, stating claims under Maryland law
and ERISA. He filed suit, however, in the state court system rather than
in federal court. The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City dismissed
the claims in 1990, acknowledging both the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts over these ERISA matters 565 and ERISA's preemption of the state
law claims filed.
Immediately following this dismissal, Shofer brought his ERISA action
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, only to be
met with Hack's motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of
the statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment for
Hack, relying on one of ERISA's few enumerated limitations, a three year
period for breach of a fiduciary duty. 66 The court dated the accrual of
Shofer's claims from 1986, when he had become aware of his monumental
563. See Brown v. Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 852 F.2d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that where plaintiff lacked reasonable legal basis for invoking state court jurisdiction,
equitable tolling was not warranted); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir.
1986) (upholding equitable tolling, noting that at time plaintiff filed action in state court it was
unclear whether federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Silverberg v.
Thomson McKinnon Secs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying tolling where
federal securities law expressly and unambiguously vested jurisdiction exclusively in federal courts,
and holding that initiation of action in clearly inappropriate forum does not equitably toll statute
of limitations); Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that filing
action in court not clearly lacking jurisdiction tolls limitations period if there existed reasonable
legal theory for invoking jurisdiction of state court, but acknowledging that filing action in court
clearly lacking jurisdiction generally will not toll statute of limitations); cf. Walck v. Discavage,
741 F. Supp. 88, 91 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (dealing with problem of personal, not subject matter,
jurisdiction, and allowing tolling because plaintiff had reasonable legal basis for originally selecting
state court system).
564. 970 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1992).
565. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
566. Id. § 1113(a)(2).
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unexpected tax liability. Shofer appealed. He did not question the arithmetic
of his claims' timing, but he argued for equitable tolling of the statutes of
limitation based on his timely filing of suit in Maryland state court.
The Fourth Circuit explained that the three year ERISA limitation
invoked by the district court applies only to claims for a breach of fiduciary
duty,567 and that for other claims raised in the District of Maryland under
ERISA, Maryland statutes of limitation apply.568 Though the district court's
reliance on only the tRISA fiduciary claims limitation suggested a finding
that Hack owed a fiduciary duty to Shofer, the court had not explicitly
found such a relationship, and the Fourth Circuit declined to make such a
determination itself. Instead, the court analyzed Shofer's claims with respect
to both the ERISA fiduciary limitation and similar Maryland statutes of
limitation, and found that under either restriction the claims were barred.
Shofer first argued that the court should admit his claims by applying
federal tolling principles. All the precedent decisions he mustered, however,
involved state trial courts that had had subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims originally filed with them. The Fourth Circuit found this distinction
crucial. Because the ERISA claims Shofer pressed were clearly within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the -federal courts, 69 the Fourth Circuit found
federal equitable tolling inappropriate. The court held that the initiation of
an ERISA action in a forum clearly lacking jurisdiction will not toll the
statute of limitations.
570
The court analogized nonfiduciary ERISA claims to state negligence
and breach of contract actions, and found applicable, as an alternative to
the limitation spelled out in ERISA, Maryland's statute of limitations for
ordinary civil suits. Coincidentally, this period was also three years. In
addition, the court had to evaluate Maryland's own application of equitable
tolling, which it discovered was even more stringent than the federal
doctrine.5 71 Shofer was unable to persuade the Fourth Circuit that the
circumstances of his case would warrant equitable tolling under either federal
or Maryland principles, and thus his claims were fully barred.
Because the Fourth Circuit confined Shofer's procedural issues to the
very narrow context of ERISA fiduciary claims litigation, its decision is
unique. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's ERISA tolling decision in Farrell v. Automobile Club of Michigan5 72
involved a slight but significant variation. The Sixth Circuit granted equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations in an ERISA action which had been
567. Id.
568. See supra note 558 and accompanying text (explaining that state periods of limitation
apply to claims brought under federal law if federal statutes themselves provide no specific
periods of limitation).
569. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
570. Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1992).
571. See Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 378 A.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Md. 1977) (stating
Maryland's "strict constructionist" application of equitable tolling).
572. 870 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1989).
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